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PERSPECTIVE

Virus sharing, genetic sequencing,
and global health security
Lawrence O. Gostin,1 Alexandra Phelan,1 Michael A. Stoto,2
John D. Kraemer,1,2 K. Srinath Reddy3
This Perspective focuses on the future of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework,
which was initially established to promote the fair sharing of public health–related pandemic
influenza samples between countries.We examine the changes that need to be made to address the
growing likelihood that genetic sequence data might be shared instead of physical virus samples, as
well as the need to expand the PIP framework’s scope and to improve its fairness.

T

he Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP)
Framework (1) was a milestone agreement
in promoting international sharing of biological samples to develop vaccines, while
ensuring that poorer countries would have
access to those vaccines. Now genetic sequencing data (GSD) can allow scientists to develop
synthetic viruses rapidly for product development. Electronic transfer of GSD could enable
wider access to researchers to innovate and share
findings, speeding development of life-saving technologies in a time-sensitive global emergency.
But access to GSD may also have major implications for biosecurity, biosafety, and intellectual
property (IP). By rendering physical transfer of
viruses antiquated, GSD may also undermine the
effectiveness of the PIP Framework itself, with
disproportionate impacts on poorer countries.
In December 2006, Indonesia challenged the
fairness of the global preparedness system by
refusing to share samples of avian influenza A
(H5N1). Concerned that wealthier countries would
gain disproportionate access to vaccines while creating cost barriers for others, Indonesia invoked
sovereign ownership of a virus isolated in its territory. The government claimed that the Convention on Biological Diversity prevents exploitation
of its “biological and genetic resources,” including novel pathogens (2). Indonesia’s decision—
supported by many low- and middle-income
countries—risked significantly impeding the capacity to monitor and respond to novel influenzas.
It took more than 4 years, but the World Health
Organization (WHO) was able to broker the PIP
Framework, finalized in May 2011 (Fig. 1). It used
a novel strategy to advance global justice by affording more equitable access to the benefits of
research. Rather than having governments commit to providing a share of their vaccine stockpiles with lower-income countries in exchange for
access to biological samples, the PIP Framework
created legally enforceable contractual obligations
on participating private and academic partners
that are involved in the manufacture of vaccines
to make vaccines available to poorer countries.
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Fig. 1. By sharing influenza viruses with human
pandemic potential and building financial and
research partnerships, countries can unite to
widen access to vaccines.

Although it has the potential to be transformative, the PIP Framework leaves fundamental
gaps in health security and in equity.
Gaps in equity, research, and security
The dynamics behind the PIP Framework were
unusual because Indonesia had something to
leverage—virus samples critical to the functioning
of the global public health system (Fig. 2). The
agreement changed an unfair status quo, whereby lower-income countries shared viruses, while
relying on ad hoc “charitable” donations of vaccines. For example, during the 2009 influenza (A)
H1N1 pandemic, vaccine donation pledges often
were not fulfilled until high-income countries had
protected their domestic populations (3). In exchange for access to biological materials, the PIP
Framework requires researchers and manufacturers to fulfill contractual obligations, such as
providing an agreed percentage of vaccines, diagnostics, or pharmaceuticals to the WHO stockpile or granting developing countries “fair and
reasonable” or royalty-free licenses to manufacture such products.
In addition to potential limitations in light of
GSD discussed below, the PIP Framework is limited in scope as it applies only to influenza vi-

ruses with pandemic potential. Seasonal influenza
viruses are excluded, as are noninfluenza pathogens irrespective of their pandemic potential. In
a globalized world, with myriad emerging infections, the framework’s narrow scope excludes the
vast majority of future threats. The ownership and
sharing of the Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus (MERS-CoV), for example, has been
controversial, with Saudi Arabian officials circumspect about global cooperation (4). Countries
lack the leverage to withhold pathogens already
in wide circulation, such as HIV, because scientists can acquire samples from multiple sources.
Gaps in global governance
The private sector’s incentive to participate is its
commercial need for viral samples to develop
pandemic influenza vaccines. But in May 2013,
scientists demonstrated that GSD could be used
to rapidly develop synthetic viruses for product
development (5). If pharmaceutical researchers
no longer require access to biological materials
to develop products, private sector cooperation
in the framework could decline.
The PIP Framework defines “biological materials” as influenza viruses with human pandemic
potential, including extracted RNA and cDNA,
which appears to exclude GSD. Although the framework also defines genetic sequences, the framework’s sharing and benefits scheme does not
explicitly apply to GSD. Noting that some countries treat the publication of pathogen sequencing data as highly sensitive, the PIP Framework
left for the future the handling of GSD—which
suggests that WHO member states and stakeholders failed to agree during the negotiations.
The omission of GSD in the PIP Framework’s
sharing and benefits scheme is out of step with
global preferences for the inclusion of genetic information of global health importance in public
domain or open access databases, to increase transparency and to advance social justice. The National Institutes of Health’s genetic sequencing
database GenBank, for example, offers an annotated collection of publicly available DNA sequences, which enables data exchange. Similarly,
the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data
(GISAID) platform promotes sharing influenzatype virus sequences. Although these sequences
are publicly accessible, researchers must acknowledge the originating laboratories that contributed
data to the GISAID platform and ensure fair use
of research findings.
Biosafety and biosecurity
Biosafety refers to the maintenance of safe conditions in biological research to prevent inadvertent
escape of hazardous materials that could harm
workers, persons outside the laboratory, or the environment. Unlike physical virus sharing, sequencing data are not inherently hazardous, and sharing
information instead of physical samples mitigates
the risk of inadvertent release of the infectious
agent by limiting access to biological agents.
Biosecurity refers to the precautions taken to
protect against the spread of harmful biological
substances. This includes pathogens of dual-use
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likely fall under the scope of “naturally occurring
substances” and thus not be patentable as defined
by the World Intellectual Property Organization
(8). GSD, however, entail additional intellectual
steps from simply isolating the virus. Still, it is
conceivable that GSD might be deemed a nonpatentable “naturally occurring substance” in
major jurisdictions such as the United States (9).
Although the PIP Framework does not displace the IP regimes of domestic jurisdictions,
extending the framework to cover GSD would
contractually prohibit unauthorized assertions
of property rights over GSD, similar to biological
materials. Such an expansion of coverage would
further the framework’s objectives of social justice, while encouraging open access to GSD.
Global health governance
Fig. 2. Bird flu in Indonesia: freewheeling toward
a pandemic. Biological samples (poultry and pigs)
for the detection of H5N1 virus at the Virology
Laboratory Control Center for Tropical Diseases,
University of Surabaya, Java. [CORBIS]

research of concern: life sciences research intended
for benefit, but which could be misapplied to do
harm, such as through bioterrorism. GSD pose
unique biosecurity threats because of their potential
for broad global dissemination, which results in
insecure laboratories or potential terrorists gaining
access. At present, the technical sophistication to
use genetic sequencing to create a hazardous agent
is beyond the expertise of most scientists, and
presumably more so of potential bioterrorists.
However, the future risk of recreating a lethal virus
cannot be discounted, especially as sequencing
data become more widely available on the Internet
and through scientific publications (6).
Governments could also use export controls to
limit sharing of biological materials or GSD.
Many countries require a license to export particularly dangerous pathogens, although export
licenses are routinely granted for legitimate scientific research. In rare instances, governments
have used export controls to limit dissemination
of pathogen GSD—as when the Netherlands restricted publication of enhanced H5N1 influenza
research—but this is uncommon for unclassified
basic science research (7).
Intellectual property
Claiming IP rights is highly polarizing because
it can make essential medicines and vaccines less
affordable. To ensure greater fairness, the PIP
Framework imposes contractual prohibitions on
IP asserted over biological materials transferred
within the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance
and Response System. The framework’s intent is
to prevent recipients of biological materials from
exploiting a global resource for their own financial benefit. Although a contract between the
WHO and a recipient may not invalidate IP rights
afforded in the researcher’s home country, it
could permit a lawsuit for breach of contract.
Countries have varying laws as to whether naturally occurring biological samples are patentable.
A biological sample, such as a virus sample, would
1296
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The private sector (e.g., pharmaceuticals, forprofit health care providers, food, alcohol, and
tobacco) has powerful effects on the public’s
health, security, and safety. Yet, the WHO finds
it hard to govern these and other nonstate actors. When it does mobilize multiple stakeholders,
the norms set are usually voluntary, such as through
action plans or codes of practice. A perennial
weakness of international agreements is their
inability to assure compliance. The PIP Framework not only includes the private sector in global
health negotiations but also creatively applies civil
contract law to enforce the agreement—a model
for future global health diplomacy.
Thus, despite its weaknesses and omissions, the
PIP Framework offers an innovative template for
future global health agreements. The framework
brought together the WHO secretariat, member
states, and the pharmaceutical industry in an unprecedented way. Traditional international law
creates state obligations, but rarely, if ever, binds
the private sector. The PIP Framework—which is
not in the form of a treaty—uniquely creates legally
enforceable contractual obligations on participating
private and academic partners that manufacture
vaccines, antivirals, or diagnostics. Consequently,
as a method of global health governance, the framework has the potential to be transformative.
Filling the gaps in the PIP framework
A recent WHO review of the PIP Framework
offered an opportunity to close major gaps but
also revealed the text’s rigidity in adapting to
rapid scientific progress (10). GSD fundamentally change the paradigm within which the
PIP Framework operates, potentially rendering the framework less effective.
In the short run, it would be best simply to
interpret the framework to include GSD as biological materials. Keeping GSD under the umbrella of a global agreement would facilitate
tracking sequencing data, while holding users
accountable—facilitating socially productive research, while limiting harmful use. A tracking
system need not be burdensome or restrict the
free flow of scientific information. A simple registration system that monitors who has downloaded GSD would help ensure that recipients
abide by global research norms and could be

incorporated into existing databases such as the
GISAID platform. Moreover, allowing free exchange of GSD without enforcing the obligations
owed to the donating country essentially unravels
the PIP Framework “bargain” after the fact, undermining both the framework’s legitimacy and the
WHO’s credibility to negotiate future agreements.
In the long run, the gaps in the framework that
we describe open an opportunity to resolve other
existing weaknesses by revising the text. A revised
framework should be driven by norms of equity
and shared global vulnerability, with the vital goals
of open access to research materials, accessible
license agreements, and more rapid development
of therapeutic countermeasures. Note that fairness
requires that lifesaving vaccines and pharmaceuticals, as well as the results of research, are
equitably distributed in low- and middle-income
countries that lack the ability to purchase products
in the market or produce them domestically.
Further, the sharing of biological materials, as
well as GSD, should be extended beyond influenza
to all other hazardous pathogens with pandemic
potential, such as novel coronaviruses. If the intent of the framework is to facilitate research and
speed the development of vaccines and antiviral
medications, a narrow scope of application diminishes the effectiveness of global health governance
(11). The use of GSD in product development could
prove to be a remarkable achievement. However,
this and other scientific advancements need to be
harnessed to safeguard populations worldwide
not simply countries that can afford the products
derived from innovative research. Global health
security is vital but so, too, is equitable access. Not
only will this ensure a more secure and healthy
world, but also a more just world, for humanity.
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